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16 May 1951

1. Definition of "psychological" operations - For the purposes of the NPSB, the President's letter defined the term to include much more than an information program. It includes "all activities (other than overt types of economic warfare) envisioned under NSC 59/1 and NSC 10/2." It might better be called "political warfare" since it includes not merely what we say but also what we do (openly or otherwise) for a desired effect, and how and when we do it. The understanding of this broad scope is basic to any discussion of the proposed organization and staff. It also relates to the backstop arrangements of the individual departments.

2. Need to move quickly - Although logically speaking one should set up an organization before putting it to work, in this case we cannot afford the delays inherent in waiting for the appointment of a Director and complete agreement on the detailed organization of the Staff. Besides, some practical experience with a specific problem may help determine the kind of organization we need.

3. Inventory of present activity - The first substantive step might be to provide three papers for the information of the Board:

a. A general world-wide round-up of present and planned psychological objectives, policies and programs. This would be a cursory survey in 5-10 pages and would include a very brief breakdown by area and then by country.

b. More detailed reports on certain groups of countries (see TAB A for suggested grouping) including a discussion of each one. These reports should be submitted separately as they are finished, beginning with the "Iron Curtain" countries.

c. Detailed reports giving all pertinent details on our objectives, policies and programs in selected countries, beginning with Iran.

It is suggested that the State Department be asked to take the lead in preparing these three papers working with Defense and CIA as appropriate. A deadline (perhaps ten days off) should be agreed on.

4. Planning function of the Staff - In order to move our thinking on the organizational problem, one of the main issues needing clarification is the role of the Staff in initiating and planning psychological objectives, policies and programs.

(a) normal Secretariat & planning function. The staff function should be limited to the following: *It is suggested that the Staff should limit itself to:*

(a) encouraging the responsible agencies to come up with ideas; (b) coordinating as necessary the planning and implementing of policies and programs; (c) initiating and formulating proposals, which would be referred directly to the responsible agencies for development and (after approval) execution; (d) general evaluation of current and proposed operations to suggest gaps, changes in emphasis, and improvements in execution; (e) reviewing proposals and research results and bearing on psychological warfare which for the purpose of this study we

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(b) public & congressional liaison

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TAB A

1. THE HARD CORE

U.S.S.R.

2. THE IRON CURTAIN

Albania  
Bulgaria  
China  
Czechoslovakia  
East Germany

Hungary  
North Korea  
Manchuria  
Poland  
Rumania  
Tibet

3. THE CRUCIAL PERIPHERY

Burma  
Indo-China  
Thailand  
Malaya  
Free China

Afghanistan  
Iran  
Finland  
Greece  
Turkey  
Yugoslavia

West Germany  
Austria  
South Korea  
Japan  
Trieste

4. THE DANGER ZONE

France  
Italy

India  
Pakistan  
Ceylon  
Indonesia  
Philippines

Syria

Panama  
Cuba

5. VULNERABLE AREA

Egypt  
Ethiopia  
Libya  
Morocco  
Nigeria  
Tunisia  
Algeria  
Iraq  
Saudi-Arabia  
Trans-Jordan  
Lebanon  
Yemen  
Israel

Argentina  
Brazil  
Chile  
Mexico  
Venezuela  
Guatemala

United Kingdom  
Netherlands  
Belgium  
Denmark  
Norway  
Sweden  
Eire  
Portugal  
Spain  
Iceland  
Switzerland  
Luxembourg  
Union of South Africa

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6. THE SENSITIVE AREA

Uruguay  
Peru  
Colombia  
Bolivia  
Dominican Republic  
Ecuador  
Haiti  
British Honduras  
British Guiana  
Martinique  
Trinidad

Kenya  
Tanganyika  
Angola  
Mozambique  
Rhodesia  
Somaliland  
Eritrea  
Liberia  
Belgian Congo  
French West Africa  
Gold Coast

7. NON-CRITICAL AREA

Canada  
Australia  
New Zealand

Paraguay  
Honduras  
El Salvador  
Costa Rica  
Nicaragua

This list was taken from a State Department memorandum dated September 6, 1950

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